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1 Introduction
Firms with similar ethical codes and compliance systems can respond to
corruption-related challenges in very diﬀerent ways. Whereas many firms
operate honestly and consistently with their codes of conduct, others oﬀer
secret bribes to procure contracts and/or other business benefits. The con-
sequences of their chosen behavior are often uncertain, partly because they
depend on external factors which are diﬃcult to predict. A firm’s attitude
towards risk is thus intuitively an important element in any attempt to un-
derstand its propensity to oﬀer bribes. However, the connection between
attitude towards risk and bribery is not obvious.
The decision to oﬀer a bribe carries several kinds of risk. The punishment
for firms detected in bribery is now higher than ever, at least in the USA.1
Customer reaction to a firm involved in corruption can be severe. At the
same time, the benefits to be gained from bribery are often uncertain as
bribery is an essentially illegal agreement that generally cannot be enforced
in a court. Besides, the oﬀer of one bribe may be followed by a demand for
others, initiating an open-ended process of extortion.
The hazards of bribery suggest an incompatibility between risk aversion
and bribery. However, the strategy of operating honestly also involves uncer-
tainty and risk. When corruption is perceived to be widespread, it is more
probable that a firm will have competitors who oﬀer bribes. A firm that
adopts an honest approach is more likely to fail in its attempt to procure
contracts.2 The distribution of unfair benefits and contracts among firms
according to their diﬀerent attitudes towards risk is therefore diﬃcult to
predict.
The propensity of firms to oﬀer illegal bribes has not been fully explored
by economists. This is in spite of a rapidly increasing literature on the phe-
nomenon of corruption, the environments in which it thrives, the incentives of
1Titan Corporation paid $3.5 million to support the President of Benin’s election cam-
paigns and was subsequently fined $ 28.5 million under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA). During 1998-2003 the Switzerland-based ABB oﬀered bribes of more than
$ 1.1 million in Nigeria, Angola and Azerbaijan. It too was prosecuted in United States
and under the FCPA, and had to pay fines amounting to $16.4 million Further examples
of FCPA prosecutions are available on the homepages of the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (www.sec.gov) and of anti-corruption organisations, such as Transparency
International (www.transparency.org).
2See Ehrlich and Becker (1972) who explain the implications of this form of self-
protection.
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politicians or public oﬃcials to demand bribes, and the welfare consequences
thereof. In an early contribution to this literature, Huntington (1968) de-
scribed bribery as the way of approaching ”an over-centralized bureaucracy”
(Huntington, 1968: 386), an approach also shared by Leﬀ (1964). This atti-
tude has largely fallen out of favour in economic theory. Myrdal (1968) was
one of the first to challenge the ‘grease money model’ by showing how bribery
creates incentives for public oﬃcials to put pressure on potential bribers, and
actually causes bureaucratic delays. Rose-Ackerman (1978) described how
corruption is an obstacle to welfare from several diﬀerent perspectives, in-
cluding that of firms. Andvig and Moene (1990) explain changes in the level
of corruption on the basis of both supply and demand of bribes. The risk
of being caught in corruption is included in their theory. Kaufmann and
Wei (1999) also reject the grease money hypothesis, that bribery increases
eﬃciency, and find a positive correlation between the propensity of firms to
oﬀer bribes and the time they waste through bureaucratic delays. Svensson
(2003) considers the connection between the ability of an enterprise to pay
bribes and its propensity to do so. Monezes and Montiro (2005) describe
corruption in the context of auctions, and find the size of the bribes to in-
crease in relation to the value of the benefit up for auction when the bidders
are risk neutral.
Good recent overviews of the economic literature on corruption are pro-
vided by Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999, 2004), Aidt (2003) and
Lambsdorﬀ (2005). However, the connections between a firms’ propensity to
oﬀer bribes, its attitude towards risk, and its reliance on self-estimated prob-
abilities are not clear in this literature. There are, however, several results in
the more general rent-seeking literature that are relevant, in particular those
presented by Hillman and Katz (1984), Skaperdas and Gan (1995), Kon-
rad and Schlesinger (1997), which I will discuss below, but also by Foster
(1981) and Skaperdas (1991). An important question for the present paper
is thus the extent to which these results are applicable to understanding the
propensity of firms to oﬀer business bribes.
Rent-seeking is an investment of resources made to obtain an uncom-
pensated benefit as the result of a ”favorable decision” on some public pol-
icy. Business corruption is indeed a form of such practice. However, most
of the rent-seeking literature does not diﬀerentiate between legal lobbying
and illegal corruption (Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock, 1980). Lambsdorﬀ
(2002) explains, in terms of welfare implications, the distinctions between
rent-seeking in its general forms, and the specific category of corruption. He
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points to the lack of transparency in cases of corruption and the consequences
of these forms of misuse of authority. Bribery also diﬀers from legal lobbying
in that both parties to the transaction benefit from the oﬀence. Legal lobby-
ing, by contrast, only benefits the lobbyist and can constitute an annoyance
to the decision-makers. Bhagwati (1982) discusses the distinction between
legal and illegal forms of rent-seeking, but concludes that it is unimportant
in analytical work on this topic.3 Tirole (1997:78), by contrast, underscores
the problems of generalizing about the phenomenon of rent-seeking: “As the
rent-seeking games vary considerably in practice, we are obliged to analyze
the issue case by case.”
This paper focuses on the case of business-corruption from the perspec-
tive of the firms. It aims at defining the uncertainties and risks of bribery,
and specifying their impacts on firms’ propensity to oﬀer bribes. A theory
about business corruption is developed using empirical data from a business
survey. The paper begins by presenting background information about this
survey and some of its results (Søreide, 2006). This study provided impor-
tant information about aspects of real life business corruption. For instance,
it revealed how corruption imposes uncertainties on firms and the benefits
they might expect from taking part in corruption.
The third section develops a more analytical approach to the question of
bribery. It begins by presenting assumptions about the choices firms make
between a legal and an illegal business approach. The significance of various
uncertainties is examined, including the risk that the award of a tender might
be influenced by corruption, the chances of getting contracts by an honest
approach, and the risk of being caught in oﬀering bribes. These uncertainties
are treated as self-estimated probabilities, and it is demonstrated how they
are likely to influence a firm’s business approach.
The significance of business attitudes towards risk is examined in the
fourth section. The section starts with a discussion of relevant results re-
ported in the rent-seeking literature, and explains important diﬀerences be-
tween legal and illegal rent-seeking. The significance of risk aversion and
risk attraction is then examined in terms of the model that was presented
in the third section. This model diﬀers from the rent-seeking models in four
important ways: (i) there is a choice between a legal form of rent-seeking
and illegal bribery; (ii) there is a risk of choosing the wrong strategy and be
3Bhagwati (1982) applies the broader term ”Directly unproductive profit-seeking ac-
tivities” (DUP).
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excluded from the competition, i.e choosing an honest approach when the
benefit is awarded in a corrupt procedure, and vice versa; (iii) there is a risk
of being apprehended in a crime and sanctioned; (iv) this study focuses on
the choice between a legal and illegal business strategy; rent-seeking models
explain the connection between the size of the rent-seeking investment and
the probability of obtaining a benefit.
However, the final results correspond to some extent with the most rele-
vant results in the established rent-seeking theory, although the underlying
assumptions and circumstances are diﬀerent in the present study.
2 The perspective of firms
The survey was conducted among Norwegian exporters during 2004, with
the broad objective of getting detailed empirical information about firms’
experiences of corruption in overseas markets, their attitudes to it, and the
actual choices they make in response (Søreide, 2006). Although the survey
chose to focus on Norwegian industry for primarily practical reasons, this
proved to be an excellent choice in terms of presenting an interesting case for
the study of firms’ propensity to oﬀer bribes. Norwegian industry is oriented
to overseas markets and well exposed to international business cultures and
attitudes. Its primarily sectors of operation are among the most prone to
corruption, notably construction, communications (IT/telecom), and energy
(gas, oil, electricity). Even so, Norway scores well on corruption rankings,
such as the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency Interna-
tional (2005), and is also commended by the OECD for its implementation
of new anti-bribery legislation (OECD, 2004). Thus, many Norwegian firms
probably experience the challenge of combining the pressures of operating in
markets where corruption is considered a common problem with the obliga-
tion to respect the new restrictions on bribery.
The survey-project, which was conducted in cooperation with the Confed-
eration of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), had three components: (i) A pilot
study involving interviews with executives in charge of international sales
and marketing in seven large Norwegian firms:4 (ii) a mail survey question-
naire with about 100 questions on corruption to which top managers in 82
exporting firms responded. (iii) a smaller survey of Norwegian embassies in
4These were large firms, three of them on the FT list of the 500 largest companies.
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countries outside the OECD area.5
The secrecy surrounding business corruption makes it diﬃcult to estimate
the actual scale of the practice. The respondents to the present business
survey though described corruption as a widespread phenomenon in interna-
tional business. And, the embassy representatives did not find it uncommon
that foreign firms make use of business practices that most likely deviate
from their own oﬃcial anti-corruption codes of conduct.
A clear majority of the embassy representatives thought that Norwe-
gian firms are sometimes or often confronted with corruption, and that an
adjustment to local informal conventions would imply adopting procedures
that would be considered unacceptable in Norway. Similarly, 18 of the 24
embassy respondents believed that a refusal to make irregular or informal
payments could reduce business opportunities significantly. More than one
third of the embassy respondents was either in doubt or likely to recommend
firms to adjust to the local culture, even if this implied bribery.6
The majority of the responding firms reported encountering some form of
corruption in their international operations. When asked about the extent to
which “unethical business practices have placed the firm in a more adverse
competitive position”, almost 70 per cent claimed that unethical business
practices by competitors had certainly or probably cost them important con-
tracts. 42 per cent said that they had reason to believe that competitors
influence tender procedures unduly. Few respondents admitted to practising
bribery themselves. Ten per cent had agreed to meet a request for payment
from an agent, an adviser or a consultant in the knowledge that this payment
would most likely be used for bribery. 27 per cent of firms reported that they
had been required to give valuable presents or bribes to be able to operate
in certain markets.
The respondents did not respond to questions explicitly on risk aversion,
but they can be categorized on competitive pressure as they were asked how
pressured they were on the prices on their main products. The exposure to
competitive pressure will perhaps inform about a firm’s ability to take risk.
However, it can be diﬃcult to interpret this indicator. Competitive pressure
may reflect a firm’s ability to survive in spite of lost contracts, but also a
more pressured situation where one single contract can be very important,
5Details and results are presented in Søreide (2006).
6The embassy respondents were also prepared to take up complaints about specific
instances of business corruption at higher political levels.
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and where the firm is forced to take greater risk. Nevertheless, exposure
to competitive pressure tells us only about a firm’s financial situation and
external market conditions, not its attitude towards risk in the sense of utility
functions.
The responding firms that considered themselves strongly exposed to
competition were significantly more likely to believe that they had lost con-
tracts because of corruption. They were also more inclined to think that
tender procedures were pre-determined, and they were more likely to con-
sider corruption a significant challenge to their foreign direct investments
(FDI).7 It is not clear if these results reflect actual higher levels of corrup-
tion in competitive markets, or rather greater suspicion about corruption in
markets where the firms compete with more homogenous products. What
it does reveal is a perception of higher extents of business-corruption among
the firms which are exposed to competitive pressure.
The specific benefits obtained by business corruption take various forms.
Probably the most common objective is to secure a contract. But by oﬀering
bribes firms can obtain other more indirect benefits such as reduced levels of
taxation, ignorance of profitable collusion in the market, or a change in the
legislation that provides the firm with market power or reduces its expendi-
ture. The most common objectives of tender corruption, apart from securing
a contract, were assumed by the respondents to be (in the following order):
exemption from tender rules; secret inside information about the criteria used
to evaluate tenders; secret information about competitors’ bids; and advan-
tageous adjustments in tender specifications. According to the respondents,
the most important underlying motivation for bribery was “the fear of losing
contracts because someone else has bribed the decision-makers”.
Most firms preferred not to make any public reaction when losing con-
tracts because competitors oﬀer bribes, although five per cent would appeal
to the tender authorities.8 The survey asked what the firms would do if the
challenge continued, and if complaints were ignored and/or rejected. 25 per
cent replied that in such a case they would “adjust their strategies to the lo-
cal business climate”, 30 per cent considered “corruption part of the game”,
7All results are significant within the five per cent level. According to a probit analysis,
the respondents who considered themselves exposed to strong competitive pressure were
26 per cent more likely to believe that competitors had oﬀered bribes.
8However, 26 per cent would request a formal explanation from the client. This is
something they are supposed to get in any case, according to common tender rules, and
is not a proactive response to corruption.
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and very few would retreat from the market. The propensity to complain
about the situation, whether to the authorities, through political channels or
in other ways, was dependent on the level of corruption.9
These results, based on responses provided by firms with significant expe-
rience of international markets, reveal the extent to which corruption disturbs
the business of many firms and introduces uncertainties into their overseas
operations. On the other hand, the results also reveal a general reluctance
to retreat from markets simply because of business corruption as well as a
marked disinclination to speak out about corruption-related challenges and
expenses.10 One implication of these findings is that business corruption cre-
ates major challenges for Norwegian exporters, forcing them to chose between
a legal business approach and illegal bribery.11
3 Uncertainty and bribery
I now develop a more analytical approach to the question of bribery. The
survey results will form the basis for a simple theory about how a firm’s
propensity to oﬀer bribes is subject to its calculation of probabilities. The
purpose of the exercise is to illustrate a firm’s uncertainties and risks in the
choice between a legal and an illegal business approach. This then provides
the context for a discussion of business attitudes towards risk in section 4.
3.1 Assumptions
Consider a firm whose goal is to make profits in a market where it operates
in competition with other firms. The firm makes a number of choices, and
this involves considering various forms of rent-seeking: The firm can hope
to obtain benefits by lobbying on behalf of its industry and hope to win
contracts by promoting its products with honest business procedures. Or, it
9The respondents were anxious about various consequences of speaking out about cor-
ruption. The impact on future business cooperation was the most frequent concern, al-
though the possibility of customer sanctions was also an important consideration.
10However, one third of the firms surveyed had decided not to enter a market because
of business corruption.
11There are, however, judicial grey zones between legal and illegal practices, and a firm
may well adopt a combination of strategies, from legal forms of rent-seeking at one end of
the continuum to the payment of large illegal bribes at the other end of the scale.
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can seek to obtain benefits by oﬀering illegal bribes to corrupt representatives
of a bureaucracy, or to a client, at the risk of being caught in corruption.
As noted, the benefits obtained by rent-seeking or business corruption
can take many forms. It can be a contract, a concession, a legal adjustment
which produces tax cuts for the firm, or a political decision which favours
some form of business strategy or reductions in the firm’s production costs.
Let us assume in this setting that a firm aims for an exclusive benefit, κ > 0,
awarded by the authorities, for instance a license to operate or trade, that will
be awarded to only one of several interested firms.12 Pursuing this benefit,
the firm’s choice between a legal and an illegal business approach is not
straightforward since important parameters and outcomes are uncertain. The
firm will have to rely on its own estimations of the diﬀerent probabilities. I
will now describe uncertainties and risks in this situation, they will also be
illustrated in Figure 1.
The level of corruption The perceived level of corruption, c ∈ [0, 1] , is
important in a firm’s choice between a legal and illegal business approach.
The firm assumes that the authorities’ decision-making process will be influ-
enced by corruption with a probability which reflects the perceived extent of
corruption, c, in the given institutions (or the country). This perceived ex-
tent of corruption also indicates the probability of succeeding with an honest
business procedure (1− c). From the perspective of the firms, however, the
extent of corruption is only an estimated parameter; corruption is essentially
a hidden phenomenon about which firms form opinions but about which they
seldom have certain knowledge. Their opinions about levels of corruption will
be based on various kinds of evidence, including rumors, experience of other
markets, published cross-country indices of corruption, or country analyses.13
Firm specific probabilities A firm’s probability of gaining κ through its
chosen strategy depends also on aspects that are independent of the presence
of corruption. These can be market conditions and eﬃciency, but also per-
sonal relationships, which can be decisive in these settings. This firm specific
12The benefit κ will now be thought of as constant, and can not be increased by a
bribe. This study concerns the uncertainties and risks of taking part in bribery, and
rent-augmentation is not a central question.
13The challenges of estimating the level of corruption in a country in a particular country
are discussed in Søreide (2005).
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probability, ρi ∈ [0, 1] , will diﬀer between the case of bribery, ρb, and the
case of legal rent-seeking, ρh, because firm specific conditions for success will
diﬀer in the two alternative strategies.14
A legal business approach With a legal and honest business approach,
the firm will invest an amount h > 0 in various forms of rent-seeking expen-
ditures, like lobbyism, promotion, etc., but also the cost of taking part in the
competition, like tender expenses. The probability for success depends on the
business climate, (1 − c), and its own specific qualities, ρh. The probability
of gaining the contract will thus depend on other factors than the size of the
investments made by (all) firms to be able to participate in the competition.
If the firm chooses an honest approach, by investing no more than the
amount h in the procedures, it runs the risk of losing the contract, not only
because of its own qualities, ρh, but also because the authorities’ decision-
making process is corrupt, which happens with the probability c. The cost
of failing in the choice of strategy is identical to the investment, h. If the
firms succeeds its outcome is κ− h.
An illegal business approach Also in the choice of an illegal business
strategy a firm will have expenses similar to those invested in legal rent-
seeking. Before it oﬀers a bribe, the firm may have invested significantly
in the process of market positioning, establishing the right contacts, and
also tender expenses. These expenses are not part of the illegal bribe, still
an investment which is lost if the firm fails in its business strategy. In the
following, this cost will be assumed symmetric to the alternative case of a
legal business approach, and equal to the rent-seeking expenses of h.
The firm’s probability for success in the choice of an illegal business strat-
egy depends on the level of corruption, c, and the firm specific probability,
ρb. If the firm succeeds it gains the business benefit, κ, by oﬀering an illegal
bribe, b > 0, while also investing h in the process. However, the firm will
not necessarily gain the business benefit if it decides to oﬀer an illegal bribe,
even if the level of corruption is assumed high. The representatives of the
authorities may reject the proposed bribe, and the firm does not make any
bribe payment. In such a case, the firm will not know whether it has been
rejected because the public oﬃcials are honest (c reflects a probability), or
14The probabilities are individual and will diﬀer between firms. However, I will consider
only one firm’s perspective here, and will not need the i-notation.
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because they already have agreed a hidden agenda with another competitor.
In either case, a rejected proposal of a bribe excludes the firm from the num-
ber of candidates, and the firm has waisted an amount h in a failed attempt
to get the benefit through corruption.
The risk of sanctions The firm’s concern if taking part in corruption,
relates to the probability of getting caught and prosecuted for the crime,
and incurring a penalty, θ > 0. The probability of this outcome is likely
to decrease in relation to the level of corruption, although it is diﬃcult to
determine the specific correlation.15 Assume that (1− c)γ denotes this prob-
ability, and that γ ∈ [0, 1]. The investigation and successful prosecution of
a firm for corruption do not necessarily imply that the firm will forfeit the
contract or other benefit it gained through the corruption. These cases tend
to take time to come to court, and the firm has often secured the commercial
benefit and/or carried out the content of the illegally secured contract by
the time it is sentenced for the crime. The business benefit, κ, is therefore
assumed independent of the consequence if caught in corruption, θ > 0.
Figure 1 summarizes the diﬀerent risks, and illustrates the uncertainties
in the choice between a legal and an illegal business approach. The proba-
bilities are denoted in italics, on the branches. The possible outcomes are
described at the decision nodes.16 To read the figure, assume that a strategy
has been chosen, either legal, H, or illegal, B. The right-hand branch for
both strategies denotes the probability, c, that the decision-making process
is corrupt, the left-hand branch denotes the probability that this process is
honest, (1−c). For each strategy there is a given individual probability, ρh or
ρb, that the firm’s chosen strategy will succeed. An illegal strategy includes
the additional risk of being caught in the crime.
The choice between a legal and an illegal business approach can now be
formalized into a simple model. Let E(H) denote a firm’s expected revenue if
15The connection between the level of corruption and the probability of being caught
in the crime is explained by Andvig and Moene (1990). However, firms can be caught by
local institutions, by institutions in their country of origin, by their own security systems,
and by the SEC in the USA if registered on a US stock exchange.
16The figure has the form of a tree only as an illustration; it does not reflect interaction
between several players. Note also, the aim of this figure is to illustrate the diﬀerent
uncertainties and risks of firms in this situation, not to describe one single mechanism by
the simplest possible model.
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κ –b-h
1-(1-c)γ (1-c)γ
κ -b-θ-h
c
-h
ρb 1-ρb
(1-c)
Illegal strategy, B
-h
Legal strategy, H
ρh
1-ρh
κ-h -h
(1-c) c
-h
Figure 1: Outcomes and risks that a firm will consider in its choice between a
legal and illegal business strategy.
it chooses an honest business strategy, and let E(B) be the expected revenue
in the choice of bribery. The forms of these expressions follow directly from
Figure 1:
E(H) = (1− c) [ρh(κ− h) + (1− ρh)(−h)]− ch
= κ(1− c)ρh − h (1)
E(B) = cρb(κ− b− h)− cρb(1− c)γθ − (1− c)h− c(1− ρb)h
= cρb [κ− b− (1− c)γθ]− h (2)
Figure 2 illustrates (1) and (2), which are denoted H and B, respec-
tively.17 The vertical axis describes the expected value of the chosen business
approach, E(H) or E(B), while the horizontal axis is the perceived level of
corruption, c.
A firm is indiﬀerent between a legal and an illegal business approach
for the levels of corruption, c∗, at which the curves intersect, i.e. where
E(H) = E(B). The expected value of an honest business approach decreases
in the perceived level of corruption, c, while the expected value of an illegal
business approach increases in this level.18
17The parameter values applied in Figure 1: κ = 8, b = 2, h = 0.5, ρh = 0.4, ρb = 0.4,
θ = 5, γ = 0.7.
18∂E(B)/∂c = K − b − (1 − c)γθ. These parameters can take values which result in
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c = the level of corruption
B
H
Expected 
value
0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
c*
Figure 2: The expected revenues of bribery versus legal rent-seeking.
3.2 Comparative statics
The size of the business benefit Intuitively, the size of the benefit, κ,
will have some impact on a firm’s decision to operate legally or to participate
in corruption. The specific connection, however, is not obvious. The sanction
if caught in corruption, θ, is assumed independent of κ, and the expected
outcomes of both bribery and of a legal rent-seeking strategy will increase if
the potential business advantage, κ, increases:
∂E(H)
∂κ
= (1− c) ρh (3)
∂E(B)
∂κ
= cρb
The impact of an increase in κ on a firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes, will
thus depend on the firm’s perception of the level of corruption, c. Hence,
∆c∗ > 0 if ∂E(H)/∂κ > ∂E(B)/∂κ, which is the case when (1− c) ρh > cρb,
and the impact on a firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes is uncertain. It will
∂E(B)/∂c < 0, i.e. that E(B) decreases in the level of corruption. Note, however, that
E(B) < 0 if [K − b− (1− c)γθ] < 0, and a firm will not choose the illegal strategy unless
∂E(B)/∂c > 0. The value of E(B) increases therefore in c, when conditions under which
a firm may consider this strategy is met.
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depend on the level of corruption, and the firm’s estimated probability to
succeed in the two alternative strategies, ρh and ρb.
19
The bribe and the rent-seeking expenses The impact of a change in
the size of the bribe, b, or the rent-seeking expenses, h, is visible in (1) and
(2). A change∆h will alter both curves in Figure 2 exactly the same, and the
firm’s decision, c∗, will not change. When h is equal in the two alternative
strategies it is unimportant for the firm’s decision to operate legally or take
part in corruption. The eﬀect if h diﬀers in the case of corruption and the
case of legal rent-seeking is also visible in (1) and (2). An increase only in the
rent-seeking expenses as part of a legal strategy would decrease the expected
outcome of an honest business approach. Bribery becomes relatively more
rewarding, and c∗ is reduced, which means that bribes will be oﬀered at lower
levels of corruption.20
A change in the size of the bribe that is required in the given context to
get the benefit through corruption, b, alters only the expected outcome of
bribery, E(B). An increase in the size of the bribe, ∆b, increases c∗, and the
propensity to oﬀer bribes is reduced.
The risk of sanctions An increase in the size of the fine, θ, if apprehended
and penalized for bribery, will have an eﬀect only on the expected value of an
illegal strategy, ∂E(B)/∂θ = −cρb (1− c)γ . An increase in θ will reduce the
propensity to take part in corruption, by increasing c∗. The eﬀect is stronger
if the firm’s probability of obtaining the contract through corruption, ρb, is
low. When this probability is high, the firm has a higher expected revenue
of bribery, and will be more likely to oﬀer bribes, in spite of the risk of being
sanctioned with a significant penalty, θ.
19The expected benefit of bribery would be reduced if θ were a function of κ. The
empirical connection between these parameters is not obvious. The penalty will usually
be in proportion to the firm’s total turnover. Whether it also increases in relation to the
size of the business benefit obtained is unclear. This has been the trend in some of the
latest court cases in the USA. Fines imposed in other cases of corruption have borne little
relation to the resulting commercial gains.
20The probability of obtaining the benefit is independent of the size of the rent-seeking
expenses, h. In this way the model diﬀers from the rent-seeking theories, where the
probability of gaining the benefit increases proportionally to h. Which one of them is the
most realistic assumption depends on the circumstances, and the connection is not even
obvious even when it comes to lobbying.
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The eﬀect of a large penalty will also depend on the connection between
the level of corruption and the risk of being caught in the crime, γ.When the
risk of being caught is lower for high levels of corruption (i.e. γ is high) the
risk of sanctions decreases in the level of corruption, and hence the impact
of a change in θ decreases in the level of corruption. Accordingly, if there is
a strong connection, γ, between the local level of corruption and the risk of
being apprehended in bribery, the consequences of being caught in corrup-
tion, θ, will have to be larger for higher levels of corruption than for lower
levels of corruption, if the sanction is supposed to have the same deterrent
eﬀect on potential bribers for all levels of corruption, c.21
3.3 Overestimating the level of corruption
As noted, the extent of corruption is an uncertain variable in this model. The
likelihood of a firm operating with unfounded perceptions about the level
of corruption is thus significant, since the extent of corruption is diﬃcult to
estimate and is a variable that varies between countries, markets, sectors and
individuals. The results of the business survey revealed a higher perception of
corruption among the firms that were exposed to competitive pressure. There
can be several explanations to this result, but it is possible that firms exposed
to competitive pressure may consistently overestimate levels of corruption.
For instance, in competitive markets firms may have lost contracts with oﬀers
that were very close to the winning bid, rather than because of corruption
practiced by competitors as they allege.
To understand the consequence of overestimating the level of corruption
in the local marketplace, let us assume that a firm thinks that the level of
corruption is c+, while it actually is c− < c+. Figure 3 illustrates this situation
and its consequences when c− < c∗ < c+, with the level of corruption on the
horizontal axis and the expected value of the strategies on the vertical axis.
The figure thus shows how an overestimation of the extent of corruption
can lead the firm to make the ”wrong” choice of business approach, given the
expected values described by (1) and (2) and c− < c∗ < c+. If E(B, c+) >
21The connection between the level of corruption and the risk of being caught in corrup-
tion, γ, will be reduced by the risk of being sanctioned in courts in other countries than
the country where the benefit κ is to be awarded. This risk is increased by US legislation
(the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and the OECD convention on combatting bribery of
foreign public oﬃcials in international business transactions, a convention which now has
entered into force in about 30 countries.
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Figure 3: The loss in expected outcome if the extent of corruption is over-
estimated.
E(H, c+) the firm would choose an illegal business approach, B, whereas its
highest probability of securing the business benefit might in fact lie in the
choice of a legal rent-seeking approach, H. The expected loss in case of such
an error of judgement is E(H, c−)−E(B, c−), as is illustrated in Figure 3.
To oﬀer a bribe to representatives of the decision-making authority can
obviously result in failure if the latter are honest. If, on the other hand,
these representatives are corrupt, an honest business approach reduces the
firm’s likelihood of securing the commercial benefit in question. If firms that
are exposed to competitive pressure consistently overestimate levels of cor-
ruption, they also consistently suﬀer higher loss in revenues due to business
corruption.
4 The significance of risk aversion
The significance of risk aversion in the given context is interesting as it may
alter the choice between a legal and illegal business strategy. I will begin by
summarizing how the connection between risk aversion and rent seeking has
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been explained in economic theory. A discussion follows about the ability
of this theory to explain business corruption as a specified instance of rent-
seeking. Finally, I will describe the significance of risk-aversion in the given
context of business corruption, and discuss the results in light of the rent-
seeking theory.
4.1 Results on risk aversion and rent-seeking
Conventional approaches to understanding the implication of risk aversion for
rent-seeking draw on the concept of the decision-makers’ utility function.22
According to this approach, risk aversion would entail that the utility of
participation in the given rent-seeking contest is lower than the utility of
the expected value of taking part in the rent-seeking contest, i.e. a fixed
amount, κ, achieved with certainty gives higher utility than the participation
in a lottery where κ is the expected gain. Risk attraction would correspond
to the opposite opinion: in this case participation in the contest would be
preferred. Risk neutrality means that the firm is indiﬀerent between the two
alternative situations.
This definition of risk aversion has been applied to understanding the
impact of risk aversion on the more general issue of rent-seeking. Hillman
and Katz (1984) find risk aversion to reduce the investments in rent-seeking
activity in cases where rents are particularly large and where there is com-
petition among the rent-seekers. The consequence is a limited spread in the
dissipation of rents, in the sense that risk averse firms will invest less in rent
seeking, and be less likely to obtain the given benefit. This result, however,
holds only if the rent is large, such as monopoly profits.
Skaperdas and Gan (1995) examine the implications of risk aversion in
several forms of rent-seeking contests where two rent-seekers have diﬀerent
attitudes towards risk. They demonstrate how the significance of risk aver-
sion depends on assumptions about the rent-seekers’ particular utility func-
tion. They compare the expected utility of competitors with diﬀerent contest
success functions (CSF) in winner-takes-all forms of contests. Most of the
rent-seeking literature assumes a CSF such that ρi = (hi)/(hi + hj), in the
22Standard risk aversion refers to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. The
form of the utility function determines how the individual compares the expected utility
of an investment versus the utility of the sum invested. See Kimball (1993) for a broad
discussion. Shapiro and Titman (1985) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) explain why
firms act as if they were risk averse, in the sense of this conventional form of risk aversion.
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case of two competitors, i and j, and where h is the rent-seeking invest-
ment. Skaperdas and Gan suggest an additional case, a logit CSF where
ρi = exp(khi)/ [exp(khi) + exp(khj)] , and determine the impact of risk aver-
sion under both cases. They find risk aversion is likely to increase the relative
rent-seeking eﬀorts in the first case, while the impact is ambiguous in the sec-
ond case.
Skaperdas and Gan (1995) also study the impact of risk aversion under
the circumstances when firms can borrow money to fund their rent-seeking
activities. The firms are thus liable for the repayment of the loans even if
they are unsuccessful and lose the contest in question. The surprising result
in these cases is that a Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies, in which
the more risk averse agent will always make greater rent-seeking eﬀort and
thus increase its probability of securing the benefit. Skaperdas and Gan draw
the intuitive conclusion that “the more risk averse are more fearful of ruin,
bankruptcy and disaster and they thus put more eﬀorts into avoiding it”
(Skaperdas and Gan, 1995:960).
Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) separate the eﬀects of rent-seeking expen-
ditures into two categories. The first category refers to rent-augmentation
games, in which eﬀorts are made to increase the value of the given benefit.
The second category denotes the more common model of rent-seeking, in
which eﬀorts are directed to increasing the probability of securing the bene-
fit. The authors suggest that the eﬀect of risk aversion diﬀers between these
two forms of rent-seeking. Rent-augmentation will always increase the (mar-
ginal) risk, and lead the risk averse decision-maker to decrease its investment.
By contrast, rent-seeking, aimed at increasing the probability of securing the
benefit, is proved to have an ambiguous impact on the marginal risk.
Risk aversion is thus proved to have an indeterminate eﬀect on rent-
seeking eﬀorts in the context of winner-takes-all contests, and in this respect
the results by Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) correspond to the conclusions
drawn by Skaperdas and Gan (1995).
4.2 The relevance to business corruption
The analyses presented by Hillman and Katz (1984), Skaperdas and Gan
(1995) and Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) oﬀer important insights into how
the propensity of firms for involvement in corruption is subject to their atti-
tude towards risk, even if they fall short of specifying the precise relationship.
The results reported by all three studies clarify the connections that can be
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applied to understand the connection between the size of business bribes,
firms’ initial financial situation and the expected revenues of the given con-
test.
However, there are also some important distinctions between the basic
forms of rent-seeking considered in these studies and the typical features of
business corruption, as they were described under Figure 1. Hillman and
Katz (1984), Skaperdas and Gan (1995) and Konrad and Schlesinger (1997)
all assume that rent-seekers have symmetric possibilities of increasing their
likelihood, ρh, of securing the benefit, κ, by investing an amount, h, in rent-
seeking. One firm’s probability of securing the benefit is assumed to decrease
in relation to its competitors’ rent-seeking investments. This assumption will
usually be realistic for legal forms of rent-seeking. However, once rent-seeking
eﬀorts encompass illegal transactions and favoritism, assumptions about the
fair distribution of opportunities appear optimistic. In cases of business
corruption it could be more realistic to suppose that one firm’s investment
in illegal rent-seeking, b, actually excludes its competitors from the contest.
In most of the cited analyses, rent-seeking investments are limited by
the rent-seekers’ financial situation. Few, if any, rent-seekers will choose
a strategy which implies expected deficit, and there is a restriction on the
size of the rent-seeking expense, h. This assumption will not apply in many
cases of business corruption. The expenses related to bribery, b, will not
necessarily imply a reduction in the firm’s endowment as the cost can be
covered by the contract that is awarded as a result, for instance by inflating
a price. Moreover, corrupt civil servants will be as willing as contractors to
make arrangements to cover these expenses as both sides benefit from corrupt
transactions. In the cases of legal rent-seeking, by contrast, it is obvious that
the rent-seekers must cover all expenses.
The lack of a distinction between legal and illegal forms of rent-seeking
in current economic theory also implies that there is no risk of sanctions,
θ, a threat which both has potentially serious consequences and is diﬃcult
to predict. The legal rent-seekers’ risk-related worries will usually be lim-
ited to the possible loss of their rent-seeking investments, h < κ. In illegal
rent-seeking, however, the additional risk of being apprehended may imply a
penalty which may be larger than κ. Threat of insolvency can thus constitute
a direct risk in cases of business corruption, whereas it is either indirect or
absent in cases of legal rent-seeking. However, there is one relevant parallel
between legal and illegal rent-seeking, in this respect. The result presented
by Skaperdas and Gan (1995) on risk aversion and liability includes an el-
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ement of risk which analytically resembles that of a penalty. They explain
that in cases of “soft budget constraints”, where the rent-seeking expenses
can exceed the firm’s financial endowment, legal rent-seekers also take the
risk of insolvency. As noted, Skaperdas and Gan find risk-aversion to increase
rent-seeking expenditures under these circumstances. The risk is defined as
a reduction in expected utility, and the increase in eﬀorts, h, is explained
by the self-protection argument. Higher eﬀorts in respect of rent-seeking
investments reduces the probability of deficit.
The argument made by Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) concerning rent-
augmentation will not necessarily apply to business corruption. Their model
describes circumstances in which rent-seeking is invested on behalf of a group
(for instance when construction companies cooperate to lobby for a more
extensive highways building programme than the authorities have planned).
An illegal bribe will seldom be oﬀered on behalf of a group of companies.
Besides, an individual firm will seldom oﬀer an illegal payment to increase
the value of a contract, unless it already is certain that it will be oﬀered
the contract in question. The rent-augmentation argument will usually be
relevant to business corruption in cases when a firm already knows that it
is assigned the given benefit, and the elements of risk and uncertainty are
reduced.23
To summarize, current rent-seeking models explain the implication of
risk aversion with a focus on the legal forms of rent-seeking. However, as
explained, there are some aspects of business corruption that may result
in diﬀerent conclusions when it comes to the connections between (illegal)
bribery, the various uncertainties and the rent-seekers attitudes toward risk.
The most relevant contrasts between firms’ decision to oﬀer illegal bribes and
their decision to take part in legal rent-seeking are as follows: One, bribery
may exclude competitors from the contest; under legal rent-seeking entry
into the competition and engagement in rent-seeking is open to all. Second,
a bribe may lead corrupt authorities to promise the briber the benefit in
question. This eﬀect is seldom present in cases of legal rent-seeking. Third,
the risks attached to involvement in bribery are usually larger than the risks
involved in taking part in legal rent-seeking.
In addition, the illegality if bribery involves a lack of transparency; legal
23The issue of creating a rent by help of corruption and legal rent-seeking is a related but
diﬀerent situation. Rent-creation activities are well illustrated by Naylor’s (1998) study
of the modern arms business.
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lobbying occurs in the open.24. Both parties of the transaction benefit under
illegal rent-seeking; legal forms of lobbyism benefit only the firms and the
lobbyists, while it may annoy the decision-makers. Besides, business cor-
ruption requires that someone with influence is willing and able to misuse
his or her power, and the possibilities to gain from bribery depends on the
extent of corruption. Lobbyism, by contrast, is an element in the freedom of
expression, and a recognized way to voice opinion and gain influence.25
4.3 Risk aversion and the propensity to oﬀer bribes
Concern about the risk of being caught in corruption diﬀers between firms.
Their ability to take risk/deficit varies, their sunk cost varies, and executives
have diﬀerent levels of risk aversion. Some investors may even be attracted
to risk. The rent-seeking theory suggests a relationship between a firm’s
attitude towards risk and its propensity to oﬀer bribes. This theory suggests
the following proposition, which will be examined using the model in (1) and
(2), a model that includes important features of the distinction between legal
and illegal rent-seeking.
Proposition 1 Increased risk aversion may increase the propensity to oﬀer
bribes.
Let the actual expected outcomes of the contest be determined by the
expressions in (1) and (2). Let ui > 0 be firm i0s utility, πj is the firm’s
revenue, where j denotes the diﬀerent outcomes, as described by Figure 1.
Let risk aversion be determined by a concave utility function, up = π
1/2
j ,
let risk attraction be determined by a convex function, uo = π2j , and let
risk neutrality be the case where the utility of the competition is equal to
expected revenues, i.e. the case illustrated by (1) and (2), un = πj. The
subscripts, p, o, n on the firm’s utility denote risk aversion (pessimist), risk
attraction (optimist), and risk neutrality, respectively. Hence, we have three
24This distinction has an impact on the size of the rent-seeking expenses. The size of
payments made to the personal benefit of corrupt oﬃcials can be very small, and still have
a larger eﬀect than oﬃcial rent-seeking, as was early explained by Buchanan et al. (1980).
However, the diﬀerence between these expenses will also depend on bargaining power and
other aspects (level of corruption, size of contracts, business sector), and it is diﬃcult to
determine a general rule about business bribes versus legal rent seeking expenses.
25Lambsdorﬀ (2002) explains several of these arguments in detail, and categorizes the
welfare consequences of legal rent-seeking versus illegal corruption.
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functions of a firm’s utility of the expected outcome of each of the optional
strategies, H and B: risk attraction, risk neutrality and risk aversion. The
appendix explains the calculation of the utility in these cases.
Figure 4 and 5 describe a firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes when its decision
is dependent of the firm’s attitude towards risk. The curves represent the
expressions in (1) and (2), now also with diﬀerent attitudes toward risk. Both
figures are drawn with expected utility on the vertical axis, and the level of
corruption on the horizontal axis. The parameter values are the same for both
figures.26 Figure 4 compares the cases of risk neutrality and risk aversion.
Figure 5 compares the cases of risk neutrality and risk attraction.
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Figure 4: Utility of alternative choices in the cases of risk neutrality (solid curves)
and risk aversion (dashed curves).
Figure 4 illustrates that a risk averse utility function reduces the critical
level of corruption, c∗, in this example. The firm is indiﬀerent between a legal
business strategy, H, and bribery, B, at a lower level of corruption, which
means that a risk averse firm will be more likely to oﬀer bribes than a risk
neutral competitor. Figure 5 illustrates the opposite eﬀect. A risk attracted
firm will have a higher expected outcome than the risk neutral, whatever
strategy it chooses. However, in the choice between a legal and an illegal
26Paramter-values for both Figure 4 and 5: κ = 7, h = 0.5, b = 2, ρb = 0.7, ρh = 0.7,
γ = 0.7, θ = 4
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Figure 5: Utility in the cases of risk neutrality (solid curves) and risk attraction
(dashed curves).
business approach, the risk attracted firm will be more likely to stay honest.
The model in (1) and (2), the utility functions described above, and Figure
4 and 5 make an example that is able to prove Proposition 1: those who
participate in corrupt business practice are not necessarily more attracted to
risk than those who prefer an honest business approach. The connection can
actually be the reverse. Firms with risk averse attitudes can be more likely
to oﬀer bribes than their risk attracted or tolerant competitors.
4.4 Discussion
The result from this analysis seems surprising given the hazards associated
with bribery, noted in the introduction. However, the result corresponds to
Skaperdas and Gan’s (1995) conclusions about risk aversion in the context
of financial liability, although the underlying assumptions and functions in
the two models are very diﬀerent.27 Will this result also imply that the
significance of the diﬀerences between illegal corruption and legal rent-seeking
27The parallel results reported by Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) suggested an indeter-
minate eﬀect, and do not contradict the result in the present paper.
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are of limited importance when it comes to the relationship between risk
aversion and the tendency to invest in rent-seeking?
Not necessarily, the correspondence between the two forms of analysis is
not complete. The present result corresponds only to one specific result in the
rent-seeking theory, that of an additional financial obligation and potential
indebtedness. This result will not inform about the ability of rent-seeking
theories in general to explain illegal business corruption. Besides, the present
study does not explain a firm’s willingness to make rent-seeking investments,
which is the focus in corresponding rent-seeking models. This paper rather
assumes that a firm in any case will invest in some form of rent-seeking,
while the main question relates to its choice between legal and illegal business
practice.
The intuition in the result follows from the self-protection argument; the
marginal risk of losing the benefit in question increases with increasing levels
of corruption. The mechanisms, however, are explained by the expressions
in (1) and (2). The attitudes towards risk determine the forms of the util-
ity functions (concave, linear, or convex). Given these expressions, a risk
attracted firm will generally have a higher expected benefit of the contest,
compared to a risk averse firm. One firm’s decision between a legal and il-
legal business approach, whatever its attitude towards risk, will depend on
the parameter-values in (1) and (2).
However, the important question in this analysis relates to the relation-
ship between the corruption levels for which the diﬀerent curves in Figure 4
and 5 intersect; the left-hand side of this corruption level, c∗, implies honesty,
the right hand side implies an illegal business strategy. The parameter-values
are only important to the extent to that they alter the relationship between
the diﬀerent critical corruption levels, which are subject to the diﬀerent at-
titudes toward risk.
Figure 6 and 7 below illustrate an example where this relationship is
altered, and where a risk attracted firm will be more likely to oﬀer bribes
than a risk averse. These figures present the same curves with the same axes
as Figure 4 and 5, now with a change in the paramter values. The firm is
thus indiﬀerent between honesty and bribery, E(H) = E(B), at a lower level
of corruption, i.e. c∗ has a low value. The arrow in Figure 6 points to the
change in the relationship between the indiﬀerence level of risk neutrality, c∗n,
and the indiﬀerence level of risk aversion, c∗p. Similarly, the arrow in Figure
7 points to the change in the indiﬀerence level of risk neutrality, c∗n, and the
indiﬀerence level of risk attraction, c∗p. The parameter values in Figure 6 and
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7 are identical.28 The figures describe the diﬀerence between a risk averse
firm and a risk attracted firm; the risk averse will stay honest for higher levels
of corruption under the circumstances given by the parameter values. The
risk attracted will oﬀer bribes for lower levels of corruption.
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Figure 6: Utility of alternative choices in the cases of risk neutrality (solid curves)
and risk aversion (dashed curves).
When a firm consider E(H) > E(B) for most levels of corruption, c, its
critical level, c∗, is high, which means that the firm is likely to stay honest,
unless the level of corruption is very high. In this setting, however, a risk
averse firm will have a stronger propensity to oﬀer bribes than a risk neutral
firm, under the given assumptions. When the firm considers E(H) > E(B)
only for low levels of corruption, the critical level of corruption, c∗, is low. In
this case, when most firms consider bribery the more rewarding strategy, the
risk attracted firms have the highest propensity to oﬀer bribes in the given
example.
The relation between E(H) and E(B) is determined by the parameter
values. The circumstances in a real world will seldom suggest that E(H) <
E(B) for low levels of corruption. This may, however, be the case when there
is a combination of several factors, for example, when the expected size of
28Parameter values applied in both Figure 6 and 7: κ = 9, h = 3, b = 0.1, ρh = 0.8,
ρb = 0.8, γ = 1, θ = 0.3.
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Figure 7: Utility in the cases of risk neutrality (solid curves) and risk attraction
(dashed curves).
the bribe, b, is very low; when the legal rent-seeking expenditures, h, are
high; when the sanction if caught in the crime, θ, is negligible; and/or when
the firm has a very high individual probability to win through with an oﬀer
of a bribe, ρb, perhaps because of very good contacts. Under more realistic
assumptions, however, the example shows that risk aversion will increase a
firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes when the level of corruption is high.
5 Conclusion
This paper explains the various elements of uncertainty and risk associated
with business corruption. A main objective has been to describe how these
factors will influence a firm’s decision to approach a business opportunity by
legal or illegal business practices.
The exercise demonstrated that the size of a potential business advantage
will not necessarily increase a firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes; this connection
depends on the level of corruption. The risk of sanctions has an obvious
impact on this porpensity. However, for the sanction to have a constant
deterrent impact on the firms’ behavior, the costs incurred by firms caught
26
in corruption will have to increase if the level of corruption increases. The
perceived level of corruption in markets is assumed to be important in a
firm’s decision-making. The model describes the expected cost for a firm if
it incorrectly assesses this level. Overestimating corruption levels may lead
the firm to oﬀer a bribe when honesty would secure a better outcome for the
firm, while underestimating corruption levels may lead the firm to be honest
when oﬀering a bribe would secure a more profitable result.
The second part of the analysis examined the significance of risk aversion.
Although a considerable literature had already described the connection be-
tween risk aversion and rent-seeking, it considers mainly the legal forms of
rent-seeking, and is not necessarily applicable to understand business cor-
ruption. However, when standard theory of risk aversion was applied on
the model presented on business corruption, the most relevant results in the
rent-seeking literature appeared to correspond with the results on business
corruption: Risk aversion will not necessarily prevent a firm from taking part
in corruption. On the contrary, this study demonstrates that increased risk
aversion can actually strengthen the propensity to oﬀer bribes.
In the real world there are greyzones between legal and illegal business
practice, and the distinction between the two will not necessarily be as
clearcut as the models developed in this paper assume. However, real life
choices will resemble the models in that firms generally will have to choose
between strategies that are closer to illegal or legal business practice. The
number of court cases involving business corruption is increasing, and the
diﬀerence between legal or illegal business practice will become clearer in the
years to come.
There are some very clear directions in which the research should be con-
tinued. The business survey revealed that business corruption takes many
diﬀerent forms, and that it can have various objectives. Better understand-
ings of the phenomenon will obviously require the inclusion of more details
on the specific circumstances. The diﬀerences between legal and illegal rent-
seeking can also have implications beyond those considered in this study,
for instance, on the scale of the investment. As noted, the size of the ille-
gal bribe can sometimes (though not always) exceed the investment in legal
rent-seeking. The factors that determine the size of these investments are
unclear and require further research.
Finally, the consequences of overestimating the extent of corruption re-
quire closer investigation. The business survey is relevant here because it
revealed that firms exposed to competitive pressure are more likely to con-
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sider corruption a challenge in business. This suggests that the connection
between market power and the propensity to take part in corruption should
be a key issue for future research.
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7 Appendix
This appendix explains the calculation behind the curves in Figure 4-7. Let
the expected outcomes of the contest be determined by the expressions in (1)
and (2). Let ui > 0 be firm i0s utility, while risk aversion is determined by a
concave utility function, up = π
1/2
j , risk attraction is determined by a convex
function, uo = π2j , and risk neutrality by the expected revenues, un = πj. j
denotes the diﬀerent outcomes, so that π1 = κ − h, π2 = −h, π3 = κ − b,
and π4 = κ− b− θ. This leads to three expressions of utility in the choice of
a legal business startegy, H, and three expressions to describe uility in the
choice of an illegal strategy, B:
uHn (c) = (1− c)(ρhπ1 + (1− ρh)π2) + cπ2
uHp (c) = (1− c)(ρhπ
1/2
1 + (1− ρh)π
1/2
2 ) + cp2
uHo (c) = (1− c)(ρhπ21 + (1− ρh)π22) + co2 (4)
And in the case of an illegal business approach:
uBn (c) = cρb(1− (1− c)γ)π3 + cρb(1− c)γπ4 + c(1− ρb)π2 + (1− c)π2
uBp (c) = cρb(1− (1− c)γ)π
1/2
3 + cρb(1− c)γπ
1/2
4 + c(1− ρb)π
1/2
2 + (1− c)π
1/2
2
uBo (c) = cρb(1− (1− c)γ)π23 + cρb(1− c)γπ24 + c(1− ρb)π22 + (1− c)π22 (5)
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